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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that “social intelligence,” a hot topic in
this community in recent years, is still not properly under-
stood, and that this has important implications for multi-
agent systems. The term shows up repeatedly in the in-
telligent agents and distributed artificial intelligence litera-
ture over many years, but in most cases the authors refer
to just limited sub-components of social intelligence, such
as norms, or trust. It is argued here that these (and other)
facets of social intelligence are inextricably linked, and that
we should only attempt to model them in isolation if we
know what the implications of ignoring the other facets will
be on model outcomes. We do not necessarily need to im-
plement a “big picture” of social intelligence for every agent
system, but having a conceptual model of this big picture
will help us to understand the implications of what we do
choose to model. This paper sketches a possible conceptual
model of social intelligence, and begins to untangle the im-
plications for different facets of social intelligence that are
commonly scrutinised by the multi-agent systems commu-
nity. The community is challenged to go further in develop-
ing this model and understanding of how its various facets
make up the whole.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computational social intelligence is a topic that has re-
ceived considerable attention in recent years (e.g. [6, 10],
but the concept of “social intelligence” has had attention in
the intelligent agents community for at least thirty years [7].
However when you look at the usage of the term, the way in
which it used often focuses on just a narrow sub-view of what
social intelligence really is, such as social structure [2], social
situation [4], norms [1, 5], and trust [3, 12]. While each of
these things is no doubt an aspect of social intelligence, none
on its own fully captures the entirety of the problem. Thus
while a superficial scan of the literature seems to indicate
that we as a community have been studying this problem
for decades, in this paper it is argued that we still do not
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understand the big picture of social intelligence; we can-
not see the forest because of all the trees. In fact we could
go one step further than that, saying that we are not just
looking at the trees, but individual aspects of a tightly cou-
pled ecosystem, and that we should not try to understand
any one aspect without considering its relationships with all
other elements of the forest.
It is argued here that we should start with a conceptual
model of social intelligence, giving us understanding of how
the various aspects influence each other, before we attempt
to model these aspects in isolation. Social intelligence is not
necessarily relevant to some theoretical areas of multi-agent
system, or even some problem domains, but when any as-
pect of it is, it is worth considering if other aspects might
also be. It is probably not necessary – in fact it would be
probably be overkill – to implement every aspect of social
intelligence within an agent framework, but understanding
the interplay between them should make the implications of
ignoring particular aspects of social intelligence more clear.
For example, what is the implication of considering social
situation while ignoring social structure, or the implication
of considering norms without taking trust into account? The
answers to these questions have obvious implications for sys-
tems involving or modelling human behaviour (e.g. socio-
technical systems, or social simulation). There may also
subtle lessons that could be learned for purely technical sys-
tems (e.g. agent-mediated e-commerce) that integrate as-
pects of social intelligence, in that they may suggest future
developments for such systems.
This paper starts with a definition of social intelligence
from the social psychology literature, sketching a conceptual
model based on this definition. The difficulty is that the
social psychologist’s perspective is that of the forest, the
big picture of social intelligence, without much of the detail.
The next stage is to begin to understand how various aspects
of social intelligence – those mentioned above and others
– relate to each other within this framework. Some steps
towards this are presented here, but this is only a beginning,
and the wider community is encouraged to contribute to this
endeavour, and to consider the implications for all types of
multi-agent systems.
2. SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
The term “social intelligence” was coined by Thorndike in
1920 [16], and perhaps the earliest clear definition was given
by Vernon, who described social intelligence as
“ability to get along with people in general,
social technique or ease in society, knowledge of
social matters, susceptibility to stimuli from other
members of a group, as well as insight into the
temporary moods or underlying personality traits
of strangers.” [17]
This definition breaks down into five components:
1. Ability to get along with people in general.
This refers to people’s general ability to “rub along”
with others; to co-exist in relative harmony despite
different beliefs and goals.
2. Social technique or ease in society.
This is the ease with which an individual interacts
with others. It is closely linked to the individual’s
self-image, and also understanding of relationships be-
tween themself and others.
3. Knowledge of social matters.
Societies have expected behaviours and standards, and
social intelligence implies a knowledge that these exist,
and an ability to work with them.
4. Stimuli from other members of a group.
A socially intelligent person should be able to recognise
and respond to cues from other societal members, par-
ticularly those related to the expected behaviours and
standards that were previously mentioned, but also
those related to the individual needs of fellow group
members.
5. Insights about strangers.
Underlying this point is an assumption that the indi-
vidual recognising other individuals being in some way
“like self.” However here it is recognised that while at
one level others are similar, they also have differences
based on temporary moods and personality traits, and
a socially intelligent individual will recognise at least
some of these differences.
Amongst these five points, we start to see aspects of so-
cial intelligence that are often highlighted in the multi-agent
systems literature. For example, points three and four relate
closely to norms and normative behaviour, while point one
has a strong relationship with work on negotiation. But the
point is that all five together combine to give social intelli-
gence, and if we examine them in isolation, we may miss im-
portant influences on behaviour. There are also other things
that are commonly regarded as aspects of social intelligence,
such as trust, which are not even mentioned. Does this mean
that these aspects are not really part of social intelligence?
Or is this definition in fact not sufficient? The assumption
made here is that in fact these aspects of social intelligence
are hidden in the detail of the definition, and that we should
be able to identify them as we develop a conceptual model.
3. DEVELOPINGACONCEPTUALMODEL
Based on the assumption that we will be able to identify
particular aspects of social intelligence as we develop the
conceptual model, Figure 1 begins to sketch just what such
a model might look like.
Three components have been added to the agent itself:
self, normative framework and theory of mind(s) (ToM(s)).
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Figure 1: A Sketch of the Conceptual Model
These three components all influence each other, and most
importantly, they influence the agent’s reasoning. This rea-
soning could be one of many existing reasoning frameworks.
“Self” refers to the agent’s self-image and positioning (re-
lationships) within society. This will moderate the way that
an agent acts based upon its relationships and the image
that it wishes to project.
The understanding of norms and normative behaviour is
an intrinsic element of social intelligence, and this is what
is required in the “normative framework” component. There
has been extensive work in the multi-agent systems com-
munity on norms and normative behaviour that could be
adapted for use here.
“ToM(s)” refers to the agent’s mental models of the other
members of society. Social intelligence requires recognising
other societal members as in some sense like-minded individ-
uals, but also allowing for individual differences. The detail
of the ToM at this stage is blurred, but it is important to
remember that at this point it is a conceptual model that
is being developed, for the purpose of better understanding
social intelligence. Any actual implementation of a model
of social intelligence may well contain far fewer details for
pragmatic reasons. That said, what is needed here? First,
it is worth noting that although every member of society
can be recognised as an individual, the level of detail in the
mental model for each individual will vary tremendously.
Those “close” to the agent will typically be represented by
quite detailed models, while those distant will have very
simple models. These ToMs should moderate the agent’s
behaviour in many ways. With knowledge of others, the
agent may seek help to further its goals. It may also choose
to support the pursuit of others’ goals, or even thwart the
goals of others. These choices will be strongly influenced by
the agent’s “self.”
Also in this diagram, outside the agent, are social cues
and social action. These are elements of the environment in
the diagram, but they are still linked to the agent itself, be-
cause even if social cues occur in the diagram, they may not
be recognised by the agent. Similarly, although the agent’s
social actions occur in the environment, the reasoning that
generates those actions must be within the agent.
It is freely acknowledged that none of these elements are
new ideas in the agents research community: examples of
normative frameworks have already been discussed, and ideas
regarding self and ToM are rich in both the affective agents
research community and the cognitive modelling research
community (see for example [9, 13, 18, 19]). The unique
contribution is in using these elements to create a framework
that can relate the various aspects of social intelligence.
4. UNTANGLING SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE
We now have a sketch of a conceptual model that can
capture the given definition of social intelligence. There is
considerably more work to be done in order to fully develop
this conceptual model, but let us return to the purpose of
this model. The aim of developing this conceptual model is
to have a better understanding of social intelligence, and in
particular, how the various facets of social intelligence inter-
act with and depend upon each other. This in turn will help
us to understand the implications of ignoring some aspects
of social intelligence when we model others. We can see
already, even in this conceptual model we have three inter-
dependent components, all influencing the agent’s reasoning.
If the assumption that other aspects of social intelligence will
be identified within this framework is correct, it is difficult
to imagine how they too will not be tightly coupled.
So what are the aspects of social intelligence that we might
want to identify? A non-exhaustive list includes: norms,
trust, reputation, negotiation, argumentation, responsibil-
ity, and obligations. These are all things which have been
discussed in relation to social intelligence, and so should be
able to be explained with reference to a conceptual model
of social intelligence. A normative framework has already
been included within the framework, so let us take the next
item: trust.
4.1 Trust as an example
Can we see a way of untangling trust from the model?
At this stage there is not sufficient detail in the conceptual
model to completely achieve this. However even though we
do not have the detail at this stage, it is worth considering
whether it would be possible to understand trust in terms
of this model of social intelligence. There are a myriad of
existing models of trust, as evidenced in Yu et al.’s recent
survey [20].
For the sake of the thought experiment, let use consider
just one model, that of Singh [14]. Singh’s model is based on
the idea of trust as dependence, with a series of postulates
about trust that are connected to an agent framework. In
other words, trust is expressed in terms of connections be-
tween actions, a trust that one state will lead to some other
state (where the first state is typically brought about by an
action of the trustor, and the second state is typically – but
not necessarily – brought about by an action of the trustee).
Conceptually, what is needed here are:
• Recognition of other entities.
• Recognition of the desired states. It is not completely
clear in the described model whether it is necessary
that the trusted agent brought about the desired state.
(It could for example be brought about by the action
of an independent party.) Nevertheless, regardless of
the intention in the original work, the perceived con-
tribution of the trusted agent to the outcome should
probably contribute to trust.
• Commitment. This is the flip-side to trust: If agent
X trusts agent Y to achieve a state given some pre-
condition state, agent Y has a commitment to agent
X that it will (try to) achieve that state given the pre-
condition; if agent Y fails in that commitment, it will
betray the trust that X has in it.
• Mutual progress. Whereas it was not clear in the
model description whether an agent’s contribution to
a desired state influenced trust in the general case, for
this case it is explicit. When agents trust each other
to achieve a common goal, they expect to see their
trustee working towards that goal.
• Teamwork. Although teamwork is explicitly discussed
in presentation of the model, teamwork itself is em-
bedded in a subset of the trust postulates. Thus to
implement this model of trust it is not necessary to
explicitly account for teamwork; support for (at least
this view of) teamwork should arise if the other aspects
of the trust model are accounted for.
• Scepticism. One agent’s trust of another agent is low-
ered if that trusted agent fails to achieve the outcome
state in an activated connection. (For example, if
agent X trusts agent Y to send goods upon payment,
and agent X has made payment but agent Y has not
sent goods, agent X’s trust in Y is lowered.)
• Faith. This is essentially the opposite of scepticism:
one agent’s trust of another agent is increased each
time the state needed to be achieved by trusted agent
in an activated connection is achieved. (So in a buyer-
seller relationship, the buyer’s trust in the seller is
achieved each time goods are successfully shipped.)
The first two points are already explicit in the conceptual
framework: other entities are present as ToM models, and
also in the relationships in the “self” component. Recogni-
tion of social cues will capture the recognition of working
towards desired states. Commitment is not explicit in the
conceptual framework, but may actually be part of the un-
derlying reasoning framework. Many reasoning frameworks
(for example the BDI framework [8]) already include com-
mitment as an intrinsic element, but in many cases this is a
“light-weight” version of commitment: not a commitment to
another agent, but a commitment to achieving a goal. To
fully capture this idea of commitment to another, the rela-
tionships with other agents would again come into play, such
as discussed by Singh [15]. It is not necessary to explicitly
account for teamwork with this model of trust, as discussed
previously, so the remaining two points to be addressed are
faith and scepticism. Both of these relate to the degree of
trust an agent has in another, or in other words, it is part
of the relationship with the other agent. This can even take
into account the fact that you might trust an individual in
some contexts but not others, such as the example in the
original paper: “you can trust your friend to take your side
in a dispute, but not against his employer.” [14]
We can see from this thought experiment that it should be
possible to capture this model of trust within the conceptual
framework, with the addition of some detail (regarding a
measure of trust and its manipulation, plus commitment to
others) to the relationship structures. As it happens, this
model is neatly constrained within the “self” component of
the conceptual model, other than the recognition of social
cues. This does not mean however that it is neatly isolated
from other aspects of social intelligence, as these too may
use and manipulate the same elements. Even if we just look
at the next item in the list, reputation, it quickly becomes
obvious that these are closely related. (Indeed, trust and
reputation are often tightly coupled, see [11] for a survey.)
4.2 The Bigger Picture
The point here is that although we were able to demon-
strate that a particular model of trust could be implemented
within the conceptual framework, it still doesn’t capture how
trust relates to other aspects of social intelligence. In order
to this, we need a categorical list of what these aspects are,
and how each and every one of them fits into the conceptual
framework. One of the challenges here is that many as-
pects of social intelligence – trust being the perfect example
– have not just one but many potential models that could
be considered. Given this variation, can we be sure that
we will correctly identify the links between different aspects
of social intelligence if we map a particular computational
model of an aspect to the conceptual framework? It would
be better perhaps to again take a step back, identifying the
important aspects of social simulation from the multi-agent
systems literature, but turning to psychology and sociology
for explanations of their relationships to social intelligence.
Once this bigger picture has been developed, we will have a
yardstick against which we can consider particular compu-
tational models of aspects, such as the one discussed above.
5. THE CHALLENGES
This paper has presented a problem – that we are losing
track of the big picture of social intelligence as we focus on
specific aspects of it – and started to sketch a solution to this
problem. This big picture of social intelligence is important
because the many different aspects of it that we study are in
fact interrelated, and if we do not understand these relation-
ships, we cannot be sure of the implications of studying a
single aspect (or set of aspects) in isolation. Understanding
the relationships will give us a better understanding of the
scope of any of these models, and also insights into how we
could grow and enhance them.
There are a series of challenges presented in this paper in
which the wider multi-agent systems research community is
invited to take part:
1. Development of the high level conceptual model of so-
cial intelligence. Only a rough sketch has been pro-
vided here, with many details to be completed.
2. Creation of a comprehensive list of the aspects of social
intelligence in which we as a community are interested.
3. Development of a relational map of each of these as-
pects of social intelligence within the conceptual model,
particularly highlighting their relationships with other
aspects of social intelligence.
Each of these three challenges is non-trivial, but the resul-
tant conceptualisation will be invaluable to the community.
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